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Project finance which is primarily used to finance public private partnerships (PPPs) has faced deteriorating 
credit conditions during the financial crisis. This has ultimately decreased the competitiveness of PPPs 
compared to traditional public procurement. This study aims to find out in how far and under which 
conditions the forfaiting model which is predominantly used in Germany can be an alternative financing 
model for PPPs. For this purpose both models were compared to identify each model’s advantages and 
disadvantages. Furthermore, analyzing the financing patterns of PPPs in German building construction fr m 
2002 to 2013 allowed further conclusions about the feasibility of forfaiting. It was found out that most of the 
German PPPs are financed by forfaiting. However, large projects are preferred to be financed by project 
finance. With the outburst of the financial crisis there was an evident increase in financing under forfaiting. 
Credit and market conditions related to project finance worsened considerably. Hence, it is assumed that 
projects initially planned to be financed by project finance have been dropped and/or alternatively financed 
by forfaiting. Overall it was found out that forfaiting is an alternative financing model for PPPs, not only in 
times of crisis.  
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CHAPTER  1: INTRODUCTION   
Over the last two decades public private partnerships (PPPs) have become increasingly 
important in providing public infrastructure and services to the community. This being 
traditionally the task of the government, the introduction of PPPs involved the private sector 
in infrastructure provision in cooperation with the government. According to the OECD 
(2008) a PPP is an agreement between the government and one or more private partners 
according to which the private partners deliver a service in alignment with the service 
delivery objectives of the public partner and the profit objectives of the private partners.  In 
PPPs, the private sector takes responsibility for construction, operation, and maintenance of 
an asset but also for financing. Project finance (PF) has been the predominant financing model 
in procuring PPPs for years. PF projects are highly leveraged, as the private contractor mainly 
raises long-term debt. Thus, there is a large borrowing need to finance the PPPs under PF. The 
interest rate for the debt is usually comprised of the reference interest rate EURIBOR which is 
variable and a fixed spread (Gatti, 2008). As the EURIBOR fluctuates with market 
movements, market ups and downs can have considerable influence on financing costs of PF. 
 
Even though there are various reasons as to why a government might undertake a PPP, the 
main argument for a PPP is derived from the objectiv  to achieve improved value for money 
(VfM). Grimsey and Lewis (2004, p. xv) define VfM as “the optimum combination of whole-
of-life cycle costs, risks, completion time and quality in order to meet public requirements”. 
According to Marllos and Amekudzi (2008) value for money aids the government to 
determine whether to pursue a project as a PPP or rather through traditional public 
procurement by taking into account the whole-of-life cycle costs and savings. On top, to 
guarantee VfM the public procurer should ensure the quality of work and the competency of 
the private contractor rather than the lowest bid. Given a long history of publicly procured 
contracts being delayed and turning out to be more expensive than budgeted, transferring 
these risks to the private sector is one way in which a PPP can potentially add value for 
money in a public project (Grimsey and Lewis, 2005). Nowadays PPPs are implemented all 
over the world as an important alternative procurement method to traditional public 
procurement. However, PPPs are often criticised to be an ‘off-budget temptation’ for 
governments, as they enable them to make public investments and postpone the expenditures 
without compromising current budget and debt (Sarmento and Renneboog, 2014a).  
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However, with the start of the sub-prime mortgage crisis in the United States leading to the 
global recession in 2008/2009, the global PPP market was hit hard (Kappeler and Nemoz, 
2010). Bank margins started to increase, liquidity and senior bank debts reduced substantially, 
PF and PPP lending started to compete for scarce regulatory capital allocations, and banks 
partially or totally withdrew from the PF market (EP C, 2009). Banks such as Fortis, Dexia, 
Depfa Bank, and Eurohypo AG which supported the PPPmarket in Europe no longer existed 
in their pre-crisis forms, as they were acquired by other banks or bailed out by governments 
(Raisbeck, 2009). Since PF projects are characterized by high leverage, deteriorating credit 
conditions make it not only very hard for companies to borrow money to finance PPPs during 
crisis but also put extreme pressure on the competitiveness of PPPs.  
 
In contrast, Germany has mainly financed its PPPs using another financing model called 
forfaiting with a waiver of claims (further on referr d to as ‘forfaiting’) for years. It involves 
financing based on the pass-through of financing conditions close to those of municipal loans 
and hence is characterized by lower financing cost through guarantees on receivables which 
have been sold by the private contractor to a bank (Blott, 2012). Even though credit 
conditions have been worsened under forfaiting during times of crisis, they did so to a rather 
low extent compared to PF. 
 
Hence, this study aims to find out in how far the forfaiting model used in Germany can 
address the challenges PF is encountering during times of crisis, and accordingly, to what 
extent and under which conditions forfaiting is an lternative financing model for PPPs. 
During the process of the study the following two research questions will be answered in 
order to draw the conclusions for this study:  
 
1) Which advantages and disadvantages can be derive from the differences of project 
finance and forfaiting in financing PPPs?  
This work intends to provide an understanding of the concepts of both financing models and 
their associated main differences to identify the limitations of each model and to conclude on 






2) Has there been an increased shift in financing PPPs in Germany towards forfaiting since 
the beginning of the financial crisis and if yes, to what extent?  
This question will analyse, if the financial crisis i  a driver for a potential increase in 
financing PPPs under forfaiting in Germany. Forfaiting has been a frequently used financing 
method in Germany, though the authors want to find out, if the financial crisis even increased 
the share of projects financed under forfaiting, and which influence the crisis had on the 
respective investment volumes.     
 
It was found out that most of the German PPPs are financed by forfaiting. However, large 
projects are preferred to be financed by PF. With the outburst of the financial crisis there was 
an increase in forfaiting. It is assumed that projects initially planned to be financed by PF 
have been dropped and/or alternatively financed by forfaiting, as PF faced deteriorating credit 
and market conditions. Overall it was found out that forfaiting is an alternative financing 
model for PPPs, not only during crisis. Even though there is no recommendation on when to 
use which financing model due to the individuality of each PPP, forfaiting can be an attractive 
financing approach especially for projects of smaller scale, since PPPs financed by PF do not 
meet the expected return of sponsors for small projects due to high transaction cost.  
 
The previous chapter introduced the background as well as the research problem and the 
research questions of the study. An overview of the prevailing literature of the subject is 
provided in chapter two, followed by an introduction to the German PPP experience in 
chapter three. The subsequent chapter four specifies th  methodology and data used in 
conducting the study. Chapter five compares project finance and forfaiting in detail on basis 
of different points of comparison, and closes with an overview of advantages and 
disadvantages of both project finance and forfaiting. Statistics showing the development and 
characteristics of forfaiting and project finance in Germany are presented in chapter six. The 
study concludes with the study’s main findings, its limitations and further research. 
CHAPTER  2: LITERATURE  REVIEW   
Even though private and public parties have worked together for years, the concept of PPPs is 
rather recent and can be traced back to the introduction of the private sector initiative in the 
UK in the 1990s (Grimsey and Lewis, 2004; Yescombe, 2007). Until today no unitary 
definition exists. However, many authors and institutions such as Grimsey and Lewis (2004), 
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EC (2003), EIB (2004), IMF (2006), and OECD (2008) provide different definitions of PPPs. 
Generally speaking, PPPs are collaborations of a private sector party and a public authority 
which share resources, risks, and responsibilities in order to realize projects that are profitable 
for the business partners and serve public goods (Akintoye et al., 2003; Yescombe, 2007). 
Thereby it is of utmost importance that PPPs provide alue for money, since they should only 
be used as an alternative for public procurement, if the latter condition applies (EC, 2003). 
PPPs bring together a number of different parties such as the public sector procurer, the 
sponsors, financiers, subcontractors, and other parties involved e.g. advisers, insurers, rating 
agencies, underwriters etc. (Grimsey and Lewis, 2004). The sponsors create a new and 
independent project company, also called special-purpose-vehicle (SPV). Grimsey and Lewis 
(2004) specify that the SPV is established to undertak  an activity defined in a contract 
between the SPV and the public procurer whereby the project requires entering into 
subcontracts with a number of different parties for the execution of these activities.  
 
Hence, a PPP comprises many stages such as (1) concepti , (2) design, (3) construction, (4) 
financing, (5) operations and maintenance (O&M), and (6) residual value or transfer of the 
infrastructure  from the private to the public partne  at the end of the contract (Sarmento and 
Renneboog, 2014b). Each partner takes responsibility of different stages depending on the 
chosen PPP model. Different forms of PPPs ranging from minimal to maximal private sector 
involvement are continuously being developed to suit the project’s characteristics (EC, 2003). 
Malone (2005) describes existing schemes whose names generally reflect the responsibilities 
of the private partner. Moreover, the IMF (2004) also draws attention to the different variants 
of PPP schemes and identifies design-build-finance-operate (DBFO) as a typical PPP model 
under which the private contractor designs and builds an asset, finances its construction, and 
subsequently operates the asset and provides the service  deriving from it. The EC (2003) 
further states that the main defining feature is the degree of private control over and 
involvement in financing. Financing comprises a major part of the project’s life-cycle.  
 
Within the scope of traditional PPPs, financing is split in two phases, namely interim 
financing and post-delivery financing (Hopfe et al., 2009). Interim financing is the short-term 
financing during the construction phase which requires high capital investment. Post-delivery 
financing starts with the construction approval of the public partner and with the transition to 
the operation phase. In Germany, the private contracto  finances the investments during the 
construction stage with short-term loans whereas post-delivery financing is usually funded by 
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PF or forfaiting (Hopfe et al., 2009). The private contractor uses different sources of financing 
such as equity, debt, mezzanine capital, or subsidies, to cover the high capital expenditures 
involved in PPPs. The mix of the latter depends on ma y factors such as the requirements of 
the public partner, the risk and reward preference of the sponsors, the risk and security 
structure of the project, as well as the chosen financing model (Weber et al., 2004).  
 
Even though there are different methods to finance PPPs, PF is the traditional and most 
common method used. Private companies have commonly used PF to fund projects such as 
pipelines, mines, and oil fields historically, whereas more recently, PF is used to finance 
infrastructure (Esty, 2004). On top, Estache et al. (2007) outline that PF is typically used in 
sectors that require large capital expenditures, have long-lived assets, require long periods to 
amortize investment costs, and generate required returns of debt and equity holders. As for 
PPPs various definitions exist for PF. According to Esty (2004, p. 25) “Project finance 
involves the creation of a legally independent project company financed with non-recourse 
debt (and equity from one or more sponsors) for the purpose of financing a single purpose, 
industrial asset.”. He clearly points out important features of PF such as the formation of the 
SPV which functions as the borrower of the project. He stresses moreover that PF comprises 
non-recourse debt leaving the lenders with a big part of the project’s risks. Connected to that 
Brealey, Cooper, and Habib already highlighted in 1996 that PF shifts a variety of project 
risks to those parties best able to appraise and cotrol them. Weber et al. (2004) as well as 
Leidinger and Prien (2010) are important authors discussing the PF experience for PPPs in 
Germany. 
 
Next to PF the corporate finance approach of funding PPPs is also mentioned by few 
(Grimsey and Lewis, 2004; Yescombe, 2007). Even thoug  PF is the dominant financing 
model in international practice, literature identifies forfaiting to be widely used for PPPs in 
Germany. Forfaiting is derived from French “à forfait” meaning to surrender or give up rights 
to something (Lütschg, 2004). Hill and Tanju (1998) specify that forfaiting is mainly used in 
trade finance involving the sale of an exporter’s receivables at a discount on a non-recourse 
basis to an investor. This allows, on the one hand, that the exporter can immediately collect 
his future payments, and, on the other hand, that the investor, called forfeiter, can collect the 
receivables directly from the importer upon maturity. Literature about forfaiting connected to 
PPPs is mainly found in Germany. Weber et al. (2004) as well as Braune (2006) provide a 
comprehensive overview of financing PPPs in Germany, thereby describing forfaiting in 
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detail. On top, Daube et al. (2008) provide a comparative framework of PF and forfaiting. 
Leidinger and Prien (2010) intended to increase the notion of different financing aspects of 
PPPs in Germany, thereby examining and describing forfaiting. Literature specifies that under 
forfaiting in PPPs the private contractor of a PPP project sells his claims for payment resulting 
from the PPP contract with the public authority to a bank (Braune, 2006; Weber et al, 2004). 
Besides, the public partner and the bank enter into a side agreement under which the public 
authority waives its objection regarding the unitary payments to be made. Accordingly, the 
bank bases its credit conditions on the solvency of the public partner, as the latter has to make 
payments to the bank. The EPEC (2011) further highlights that the forfaiting model is a 
variant of the “guaranteed minimum service charge” which is a state guarantee (SG) type 
under which the Government guarantees that unitary p yments during the operational phase 
do not fall below a certain threshold, regardless of the private contractor’s performance.  
 
As the financial crisis had a big influence on the d velopment of PPPs in Germany, 
Partnerships Germany (2010) published, on behalf of the German Ministry of Finance, an 
extensive paper analysing the consequences of the financial crisis on PPPs in Germany and 
more interestingly the effects on both financing methods. However, not only Germany has 
seen a significant drop in PPP activity with the start of the financial crisis. In 2010 Kappeler 
and Nemoz published an economic and financial report pr viding a descriptive assessment of 
the evolution of PPPs in the EU with focus on the financial crisis. The two authors point out 
that PPP activity dropped by almost 50% compared to 2007 within the EU, since PPP 
transaction stood only at 15.8 € B in 2009. Moreover, DLA Piper (2009) provides an 
overview of the state of the European market during crisis time and analyses every country’s 
market situation in detail. Burger et al. (2009) also investigated the impact of the financial 
crisis on PPPs. Identifying channels through which the crisis affect PPPs, Burger et al. (2009) 
found out that cost of and access to finance are the main channels influencing particularly 
projects in pipeline. They further show possible measures to help PPPs during crisis and claim 
that governments must be rewarded for taking additional risk. Other authors have also tried to 
come up with responsive solutions, as the traditional PPP model using PF didn’t provide 
satisfactory benefits anymore. The EPEC (2009) published a paper identifying 3 main types 
of response available to public authorities and describe in another paper (2011) the various 
forms of SGs available for PPPs. Raisbeck (2009) discusses new PPP models and concludes 
that governments are called to take on more financial risks through government backed or 
guaranteed funds. On top, Tam (2012) discusses different policy options and argues that 
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limited government guarantees of bank debt and revenue will be the most effective method to 
ensure that new PPPs attract sufficient investments.  
CHAPTER  3: THE  GERMAN  PPP EXPERIENCE   
As in other countries, in Germany PPPs were also evolving due to the budgetary constraints 
of public institutions and the need for infrastructure investments for restoration of public 
services (Frank and Alfen, 2006; Lange 2006). To close this infrastructure gap PPPs emerged 
as an alternative to traditional public procurement. I  order to coordinate and facilitate the 
development of PPPs in Germany, the State set up different institutions in the early 2000s. 
First, in 2002 the social democratic former Chancellor Schröder announced the establishment 
of the Federal PPP-Competence Centre (Alfen and Leupold, 2007). Moreover, a Steering 
Committee was established in 2002 which defined among others the PPP procurement process 
and different PPP models applied in public real estat  (Alfen and Leupold, 2007). In 2004, the 
Federal PPP Task Force was founded as a staff unit under the auspices of the Federal Ministry 
of Transport, Building and Urban Affairs (Fischer et al., 2006). To develop the PPP initiative 
of the government the PPP Task Force elaborated a working program centering on the 
improvement of framework conditions, the establishment of a competence network, 
knowledge transfer and public relation (Christen, 2006). In 2008 the German PPP Task Force 
was replaced by the current national PPP Unit Partnerships Germany which is an independent 
advisory entity providing best practice to public authorities (DLA Piper, 2009). In 2005 after 
the German elections, the new government referred to PPP in its coalition agreement as an 
alternative procurement method of increasing importance (Alfen and Leupold, 2007). The 
former minister of finance stated to increase PPPs’ share of public sector investment from 4% 
to 15% which was similar to the PPP level of other comparable developed countries 
(Steinbrück, 2007). 
 
In Germany, PPPs are implemented on 1) the national 2) regional (Bundesländer) and 3) 
municipal level (Schaefer and Voland, 2009). Contrary to the UK and France, in Germany 
each federal state is responsible for different tasks and tendering out separate projects (Blott, 
20012). Due to the federal structure of Germany, task forces were not only set up on a 
national level but also by regional Bundesländer. On top, each of the 16 Bundesländer has a 




There is no PPP law but projects are subject to a number of legal regimes in federal and state 
laws including constitutional and administrative law, the law of public procurement, budget 
law, tax law, investment and finance law, the law on public subsidies, contract law, and 
corporate law (Schaefer and Voland, 2009). Though, with the enacting of the federal PPP 
Acceleration Act (ÖPP-Beschleunigungsgesetz) in 2005 a first step towards a more 
comprehensive regulation on PPPs was made by providing a framework law which has 
changed a number of previously existing provisions relevant to operating PPPs (Schaefer and 
Voland, 2009). This includes including the Act against Restraints of Competition, the Public 
Procurement Ordinance, the Federal Budget Law, the Federal Law on Investment, and tax 
laws.  
 
In accordance with German law there are seven different contract models, namely the owner 
model, the acquisition model, the leasing model, the rent model, the license model, the 
contracting model, and the company model (Table A1 in Appendix). The chosen type of 
contract model depends among others on the desired degree of influence of the public 
procurer (Hoppenberg et al., 2009). Most of the models make use of payments based on 
availability. Here the public procurer makes payments for performance irrespective of 
demand (cf. Table A1 in Appendix).  
 
PPPs can be found in many areas when it comes to infrastructure. There are 5 main sectors 
under which PPPs are set up in Germany, namely building construction (also referred to as 
public real estate), transport, health care, IT & service management as well as street lighting. 
However, the current discussion and literature in Germany concentrates mainly on PPPs in 
building construction, as most of the PPPs in Germany have been realized in this sector. 
Within building construction there are the following sectors: 1) education 2) health 3) prison 
4) sports/ leisure 5) administration and 6) others. Projects relating to education are dominant 
(Graph A1 in Appendix).  
 
Graph A2 (in Appendix) provides an overview of the development of the number of projects 
and investments in building construction. After a sharp rise in PPP activity since 2002, the 
PPP market has seen a striking drop in PPP activity since 2008 marked by an all-time low of 
the last decade in 2013. In 2013, only 11 new projects have been awarded with an associated 
investment volume of 249 € M. During the peak year 2007, 32 projects with an investment 
volume of 865 € M have been established. As of March 6th , 2014, 204 PPPs carrying an 
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investment volume of 5,895 € M were awarded with most of them being implemented on the 
local level, followed by the regional Bundesländer and the Federal State (Graph A3 in 
Appendix). Relatively to the size of the German economy private funding remains small 
lagging behind larger EU countries, an example of which is the total PPP investment volume 
in 2011 being a tenth of France’s (Blott, 2012). 
 
It is also important to mention that PPPs have encou tered a lot of criticism in Germany. The 
Courts of Audits of the Federal State and regional Bundesländer (2011) state that PPPs are not 
advantageous compared to public procurement. They are not generally against PPPs but insist 
that objective and transparent evidence need to be provided to prove that a PPP is a better 
project alternative than public procurement. Their study about the economic feasibility of 
PPPs (2011) analyzing 30 projects revealed among others that disadvantageous assumptions 
about public procurements were often made degrading the public procurement alternative and 
ultimately favoring PPPs. In general the Courts of Audits demand that PPPs which cannot be 
financed under public procurement should not be financed alternatively with PPPs and also 
should not be used to bypass new indebtedness interdictions, as these seem prevailing motives 
for PPPs. Moreover, PPPs have to be disclosed thoroughly in public budgets at any time 
during the contract life time. On top of that contrac s and feasibility studies are confidential 
and not available to the public making it hard to judge the profitability of PPPs (Fischer, 
2012).  
 
Summing up, the current striking drop of PPP projects in Germany cannot only be traced back 
to the financial and sovereign debt crisis but also to growing public hostility (Blott, 2012). 
The governments’ PPP target of 15% of public investm nt was therefore never reached (DLA 
Piper, 2009). Nevertheless, the increasing politica support allowed the establishment of 
different institutions in order to identify and remove major barriers and obstacles for PPPs 
(Alfen and Leupold, 2007). However, the German market is still lagging behind other EU 
countries. There is a strong voice coming from the construction industry, banks, and some 
think tanks, but there is also another voice coming from state departments saying that 







CHAPTER  4: METHODOLOGY  AND  DATA 
The study is based on qualitative and quantitative analyses. It aims to derive the advantages 
and disadvantages from the differences of PF and forfaiting. Secondly, this work tries to find 
out, if there has been a shift in financing PPPs in Germany towards forfaiting since the 
beginning of the financial crisis and if yes, to what extent.  
 
Therefore, an understanding of the concepts of bothfinancing models and their associated 
main differences is necessary to identify the limitations for each model. Qualitative analysis is 
being applied to explain and compare the two financing models. This comparison is 
completed by deriving advantages and disadvantages of the two models. 
 
The second part of the study is based on quantitative analysis. We intend to find, if the 
financial crisis was a driver for a potential shift from PF to forfaiting. Accordingly, the data 
sample will first be analysed as a whole. Afterwards, two sample splits are conducted.  
 
The data used was provided by the Federation of the German Construction Industry (FGCI). 
The data contains the PPP projects awarded in building construction from 2002 until March 
6th, 2014. The data comprises the name of the project/loca ion, the sector of the PPP, the 
private contractor, the public procurer, the financing model, the month of financial close, the 
investment volume as well as the contracting model. However, due to an increased 
confidentiality of the private contractors, the data provided to and by the FGCI concerning the 
financing model is partly incomplete since 2011. With the help of the FGCI’s online database1 
the financing model of further 4 projects was retrieved. In the end, 30 projects out of 204 
projects had to be removed, as the financing model was unknown. A further 11 projects for 
which the post-delivery stage was not financed by the private partner were taken out as well. 
In the end a sample of 164 projects was left for the analysis.  
 
After examining the whole sample, the data of the first sample split, which is centre of 
analysis, was analysed taking the bankruptcy of Lehman Brother in September 2008 as a 
reference point. Here, the first period comprises projects from January 2002 to August 2008, 
whereas the second period considers data from September 2008 to June 2013. A second 
sample split, taking the start of the U.S. sub-prime crisis, which is connected with an increase 




in interbank lending in August 2007, as a reference point, is conducted to identify since when 
the financial crisis severely impacted financing PPPs in Germany. Here, the first period 
comprises projects from January 2002 to August 2007, whereas the second period considers 
data from September 2007 to June 2013.  
CHAPTER  5: COMPARISON  OF PROJECT FINANCE  
AND  FORFAITING   
The following chapter introduces the concepts of prject finance and forfaiting in more detail. 
Moreover, with respect to different points of comparison, the differences of the two models 
are derived. The chapter closes with an overview of the main findings of the analysis and 
presents advantages and disadvantages of each model. 
5.1 THE CONCEPT OF PROJECT FINANCE IN PPPS 
There is not a rigid PF model which is applied to all PPP projects using PF, since every 
project is different in nature (Esty, 2004). According to Fight (2006, p. 1) “Project finance is 
generally used to refer to a non-recourse or limited r course financing structure in which 
debt, equity and credit enhancement are combined for the construction and operation, or the 
refinancing, of a particular facility in a capital-intensive industry”. As a legally independent 
SPV is created to run the PPP project, PF is referred to as off-balance sheet financing (Davis, 
2003; Yescombe, 2007), since the project’s assets and li bilities do not appear on the 
sponsor’s balance sheet.  
 
PF is applied over the whole life-cycle of the PPP project. Depending on the riskiness of the 
project, the SPV raises an appropriate mix of equity and debt which consists of senior and 
mezzanine debt also referred to as junior or subordinated debt, to finance the capital intensive 
construction stage (Sarmento and Rennebog, 2014b). Since most of the financing comes from 
debt, PPPs are highly leveraged projects (Yescombe, 2007). When reimbursing debt and 
equity during the operational stage, the SPV has to first pay back the senior debt, as it has 
priority right on the cash flows, then mezzanine debt and finally reward shareholders for their 




The public procurer has to make unitary payments which are initiated with the start of the 
operational stage, to the private contractor (Leidinger and Prien, 2010). On the other hand, the 
SPV needs to make milestone payments to the construction consortium during the 
construction stage, and payments to suppliers and investors to reward their capital 
commitment during the operational stage (cf.Figure 1).  
 
On top, the government can provide different forms of guarantees to bear some downside risk 
of the PPP. With the onset of the financial crisis, the use of guarantees has become more 
prevalent and varied in nature (EPEC, 2010). 
 






                                                 Source: Adapted from Sarmento and Renneboog (2014b) 
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5.2 THE CONCEPT OF FORFAITING WITH A WAIVER OF CLAIMS IN PPPS 
Forfaiting which is mainly used in trade finance is an agreement under which “an exporter 
surrenders ownership of export receivables by selling them at a discount to a forfaiter 
(financial institution/bank etc.) in exchange for cash” allowing exporters to maximize cash 
flow and eliminate inherent payment risk (Lütschg, 2004, p. 27).  
 
Transferred to PPPs, forfaiting involves the sale of claims2, namely the private contractor’s 
receivables resulting from the PPP contract with the public procurer, to a bank which 
consequently has to collect unitary payments from the public partner (Weber et al., 2004). 
Forfaiting in PPPs is combined with a waiver of claims (also called waiver of objection) 
which is an agreement specifying that the public procu er waives its right to reduce or 
suspend the unitary payments in case of deficient prformance by the private contractor 
(Daube et al., 2008). Functioning like a guarantee, th  waiver of claims allows credit 
conditions close to those of municipal loans. However, the actual forfaiting transaction is only 
set up during the post-delivery stage as shown in Figure 2. 
 
Figure 2: PPP life-cycle financing under Forfaiting 
 
Source: own exhibit 
 
Looking at the whole-life-cycle of the PPP, the debt is provided by a bank (or bank syndicate) 
to the private contractor as an interim loan for construction at the beginning of the project 
(Leidinger and Prien, 2010). The interim loan is replaced by forfaiting financing with the 
beginning of the operation phase.  
 
Figure 3 summarizes the steps involved in financing PPPs under forfaiting. First, after 
construction completion the public procurer needs to approve the private contractor’s 
                                                             
2 Equal the amount of the debt raised  
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construction work, as the payment obligations of the public procurer to compensate the 
private contractor for his construction work only arise after approval of the facility (Weber et 
al., 2004). The payment obligations are, however, sold to a bank as specified above. With the 
money received by the sale of claims the private contractor pays back the interim loan 
(Leidinger and Prien, 2010).   
 
However, only part of the receivables belonging to the private contractor is sold on à-forfait 
bases (so called Teilforfaitierung), namely the receivables for construction (Weber et al., 
2004). Receivables arising from the maintenance during the operation phase are excluded, as 
it would be impossible to reduce unitary payments i case the private contractor breaches 
contractual agreements during the operation phase (Weber et al., 2004).  
 
Hence, the public procurer pays the unitary payments related to the construction work to the 
bank, whereas unitary payments resulting from the op ration contract is directly paid to the 
private contractor. As under PF, the SPV needs to make milestone payments to the 
construction consortium and pay suppliers etc. for their services during the operational stage 
(cf. Figure 4).  
 
Figure 3: Steps involved in a PPP Forfaiting transaction 
 
Source: Adapted from Weber et al. (2004) and Leidinger and Prien (2010); debt can be sold to the bank 
financing the interim loan or to another bank 
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Source: Adapted from Weber et al. (2004) and Leidinger and Prien (2010); debt can be sold to the bank 
financing the interim loan or to another bank 
16 
 
5.3 RISK ALLOCATIONS 
There are various types of risk involved in PPPs. Some risks are retained by the public 
procurer, whereas other types of risk are transferred to the private contractor, or are shared 
between both parties (Sarmento and Rennebog, 2014a).  
 
In general, PPPs are characterized by a transfer of risk to the party which is best able to 
manage it (Grimsey and Lewis, 2005). In PF banks bear credit risk during the whole life 
cycle, as PF is characterized as off-balance sheet financing with limited recourse to 
shareholders and high leverage (Gatti, 2008). In exchange for bearing risks, banks impose 
tight discipline on management through contracts, oversight, and regular debt service 
payments (Esty, 2004). Accordingly, banks set up an extensive due diligence which includes 
technical, financial, legal and market due diligenc, and implement a comprehensive project 
monitoring over the life cycle of the loan period informing about any impending or existing 
performance dysfunctions and allowing to react accordingly (Weber et al., 2004). The project 
company needs to provide, next to equity, certain guarantees such as pledges (bank deposits, 
sponsor’s equity stake), Step-in-Rights as well as reserve accounts, and has to comply with 
certain financial ratios (Leidinger and Prien, 2010). With these instruments banks make sure 
that sponsors share the risks. This ultimately incentivizes sponsors to maximize the project’s 
performance. Next to certain types of risk3, the risk of the public partner is based on the 
likelihood of the private contractor’s bankruptcy or c ntract termination, as the public partner 
faces additional cost in case of occurrence resulting from the new tendering process or 
eventual higher unitary payments (Leidinger and Prien, 2010).   
 
In contrast, under the scope of forfaiting banks will only bear risk during the construction 
phase, as the private partner pre-finances the construction stage (Weber et al., 2004). 
Accordingly, the bank’s risks comprise the solvency risk of the project company and the risk 
of completion. Therefore, due diligence is only conducted by the banks for the planning and 
construction phase (Leidinger and Prien, 2010). During the operation phase there is only a 
small risk transfer from the public partner to the private contractor due to the waiver of claims 
(Leidinger and Prien, 2010). As the public partner eds to fulfill payment obligations for the 
bought receivables independently from the private contractor’s performance, it is the public 
partner that stays with a big part of risk (Weber et al, 2004). To limit this risk additional 
                                                             
3 There is extensive literature on which risk should be borne by which party. Risk differs depending on the 
project. Some political and legal risk are said to be always born by the public party. 
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securities, next to equity, are implemented to guarantee an appropriate performance of the 
private contractor. The security approach and instruments used can be the same as mentioned 
under PF, however, the implementation of reserve accounts has not been common practice so 
far (Leidinger and Prien, 2010). Since banks do not require an equity stake of the sponsors (cf. 
5.4), public authorities need to make sure that enough equity is provided to involve the private 
partner in risk sharing (Weber et al, 2004).  
 
Even though a variety of methods is used to involve the private partner in risk sharing under 
forfaiting, no optimal risk allocation can be achieved, leaving the public partner with a major 
part of risk (Leidinger and Prien, 2010; Weber et al., 2004). However, compared to traditional 
procurement forfaiting offers improvements in risk transfer, as the waiver of objection is only 
issued after the construction approval transferring the risk of timely and proper construction 
of the asset to the private partner (Leidinger and Prien, 2010). 
5.4 CAPITAL STRUCTURE 
Under both models the high capital investment phase is mostly financed with debt making 
PPPs highly leveraged projects. However, the degree of leverage for PF is reported differently 
in literature. In PF debt usually amounts to 60-90% of provided financing but can be above 
90% depending on the risk structure (Weber et al., 2004). Depending on the type of projects, 
Yescombe (2007) states that a debt/equity ratio (D/E) of 80% is appropriate for an 
infrastructure project with usage risk (e.g. toll rad). As leverage varies by project sector, Esty 
(2004) specifies the average D/E for PF amounts to 70%. Nevertheless, banks require an 
equity stake to cushion possible cuts in unitary paments in case of the private contractor’s 
bad-performance. The provision of equity is, as mentioned above, a risk management 
instrument and furthermore a mean to link the sponsors to the success of the project to 
ultimately maximize their performance. For most, the equity stake depends on the riskiness of 
the project, the sustainability of the cash flows and the guarantees provided (Weber et al., 
2004). 
 
Under forfaiting debt of the project frequently exceds 90% (Weber et al., 2004). The equity 
stake is low, as there are no equity requirements for municipal loans4 under German law5 
(Partnerships Germany, 2010). The biggest part of equity is however quasi-equity in form of 
                                                             
4 Financing conditions of forfaiting close to the ones of municipal loans cf. 5.2 
5 according to § 10 KWG in conjunction with SolvV 
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mezzanine capital (subordinated shareholder loans) (Weber et al., 2004). As explained before, 
equity can be provided by sponsors or financial investors. However, the involvement of 
financial investor is not constructive under forfaiting, as equity stakes are quite small and 
usually comprised by mezzanine capital (Weber et al., 2004).  
5.5 FINANCING COSTS AND CONDITIONS  
As PPPs are mostly financed through debt under both met ods, borrowing costs have a high 
impact on total financing costs. However, costs differ considerably, due to the fact that banks 
base credit conditions on the solvency of the project company under PF and on the public 
procurer under forfaiting (Weber et al., 2004).  
 
Substantial costs for the debt raised under PF include the following: interest, cost of hedging, 
commitment and arrangement fee as well as documentation nd processing fee (Weber et al., 
2004). For both models the interest rate of the debt is composed of the reference interest rate 
(ISDAFIX6) and a project specific spread which is dependent on he risk structure of the 
project. Interest rates can be variable or fixed respectively fluctuating in a pre-determined 
interval (Weber et al., 2004). However, under PF in PPPs bank loans mostly have floating 
interest rates. Depending on the riskiness of the project the interest spread varies between 90 
bps and 130 bps for the construction phase and between 80 bps and 140 bps for the operation 
phase for PF in Germany (Weber et al., 2004). However, rates increased with the start of the 
financial crisis (cf. 5.7). Besides, due to intense project monitoring and due diligence in PF, 
transactions costs are high and transaction times are long. As the due diligence has to be done 
independently of the project’s volume, transaction c sts are rather fixed (Weber et al., 2004). 
 
Under forfaiting the bank assesses the solvency of the private contractor for the interim loan 
but bases its financing conditions for the long-term financing of the project on the 
creditworthiness of the public procurer due to the waiver of objection (Leidinger and Prien, 
2010). Therefore, advantageous financing conditions which are close to those of municipal 
loans can be obtained for the long-term financing of the project (Leidinger and Prien, 2010; 
Weber et al, 2004). The cost of debt is less comprehensive and includes interest, cost of 
hedging and a structuring fee (Weber et al., 2004). Depending on the riskiness of the project 
                                                             
6 To display long-term refinancing costs of banks the ISDAFIX became the leading reference interest rate in 




the interest spread varies between 20 bps and 50 bps7 for both the construction and operation 
phase (Weber et al., 2004). Increasing rates are also observed under forfaiting with the start of 
the financial crisis (cf. 5.7). As due diligence and project monitoring are less extensive, 
transaction time and cost are low (Weber et al., 2004). 
 
In PF credit periods are usually aligned to the duration of the project. Therefore, credit periods 
of 20 to 25 years, on special occasions also longer, ar  feasible. Nevertheless, lenders usually 
insist that loans are to be reimbursed 2 to 5 years before the termination of the contract 
leaving a so-called Tail. In PF credits until 25 € M are frequently provided by just one bank, 
whereas higher financing requirements are usually provided by a syndicated loan. In 
comparison, within the framework of forfaiting banks are more willingly to fix the interest 
reference rate over the whole credit period. Moreover, banks are more likely to match the 
lenders’ terms to the life-cycle period of the project accordingly abstaining from a Tail. 
(Weber et al., 2004, pp. 34-36, 58)          
5.6 PAYMENTS FOR OBTAINED FINANCING 
As banks oblige borrowers to repay their debt, payments have to be prompted to service the 
project company’s debt obligation. Under both models the public partner usually pays for the 
services provided by the private party. Though, until the approval of construction the public 
partner has no immediate payment obligations under either method (Weber et al., 2004). 
Accordingly, if the project fails in the construction phase, assets of the project company are 
used to repay the interest and principal for construction (Leidinger and Prien, 2010).  
 
Under PF the public partner makes its unitary payments to the project company (cf. 5.1). The 
reimbursement of the obtained financing used for construction is ultimately done by the 
generated cash flows of the project company. Payments to the SPV are based on performance 
and can therefore be cut in case of bad performance c ording to the bonus-/ malus clauses 
specified in the PPP contract (Weber et al., 2004; Leidinger and Prien, 2010). In contrast, the 
private partner also has the opportunity to obtain a bonus for certain achievements.  
 
In comparison, under forfaiting the private contractor collects the public procurer’s payment 
obligation resulting from construction by selling the latter to a bank. The collected money is 
                                                             
7 Differences in rates can be found in literature; cf. Table A2 in Appendix 
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used to repay the debt (cf. 5.2). In turn the bank becomes the creditor of the public partner 
who has to make unitary payments for construction to the bank which bought the sold claims. 
Due to the waiver of claims payments need to be done independently of the service quality of 
the private contractor. Though, this applies only to the payments resulting from construction 
for which a waiver of claims has been issued. Accordingly, unitary payments for operation 
which go directly to the project company can be cut, since the same bonus-/ malus agreements 
apply, just as under PF (Weber et al., 2004).  
5.7 FINANCIAL CRISIS 
The increase in financing costs affected both models uring the financial crisis. This sub-
chapter analysis is based on Partnership Germany’s (2010, pp. 31-62) analysis about the 
consequences of the financial crisis on PPPs in Germany. 
 
With the break-down of interbank lending credit margins started to increase significantly. An 
overview of the financing costs before and during the financial crisis for both models is 
shown in Table A2 (in Appendix). Especially the market for PF was hit ard. Margins of 
about 350 bps above the reference interest rate werobservable for projects in PF in 2009. 
Moreover, liquidity costs as well as fees such as for arrangement and commitment rose. 
Financing cost reached a critical level, and PPPs were often not advantageous to public 
procurement any more. Financing volumes under PF have been reduced significantly due to 
the collapse of the syndication market and consequent establishment of “club deals” under 
which banks only make a promise for their part of the financing. As the risk aversion of banks 
increased, complex PPP projects with market risks were very hard to implement. On top of 
that, the number of banks offering PF decreased considerably. Banks switched from long term 
to mini-perm8 lending, especially for projects out of Germany. In general, short commitment 
periods for financing proposals became a big issue, ince changing financing conditions 
before financial closure result in further assessments and therefore transaction cost and time. 
On top, a drop in investment volumes for PF arrangements has been observed during earlier 
crises as well. Several crises in the late 1990s and e rly 2000s such as the Asian and Russian 
crisis dramatically reduced total investment (Esty, 2004). 
 
                                                             
8 Mini-perm structures have been introduced for project finance because of the low long-term financing 




Under the scope of forfaiting an increase in liquidity costs as well as an increase of loan 
margins ranging between 40 bps and 100 bps was observa l . However, German municipal 
loans were also facing increasing margins of 30 bps to 50 bps. No big issues have been faced 
to place big financing volumes or loan periods for over 20 years, and the bank’s risk aversion 
did not change under the scope of forfaiting. 
 
In summary, both models were hit by the financial crisis. However, consequences are lower 
for forfaiting due to its municipal loan financing conditions. Even though forfaiting’s 
financing margins are not as low as during pre-crisis t mes, projects are economically feasible 
while not all projects financed by PF are advantageous to public procurement during crisis.  
5.8 MAIN FINDINGS  
To increase the competitiveness of PPPs private bidders seek to reduce the financing costs 
with well-thought-out financing structures (Weber et al., 2004). PF and forfaiting are both 
characterized by differing risk allocations and financing costs. Financing PPPs with forfaiting 
offers favorable financing conditions close to those of municipal loans. These improved 
financing conditions come at the expense of the public procurer who has to take back risk 
which should be transferred to the private contractor according to the PPP concept (Weber et 
al., 2004). Forfaiting remained to be a feasible financing model during the financial crisis, 
since credit conditions worsened to a lower extent. Summarizing the most important points of 
















Table 1: Differences of Project Finance and Forfaitng  
Point of comparison Project Finance Forfaiting 
Risk allocation high level of risk allocation low level of risk allocation 
Risk for                                                           
the banks,                                             
public and                                  
private partner 
comparing the two 
models 
banks: high                                                    
private partner: moderate                                             
public partner: low  
banks: low                                                                           
private partner: low to moderate                              
public partner: high 
Leverage 
high level:                                                                                  
60-90% or even higher than 90% 
(Weber et al., 2004)                                    
70-90% (Esty, 2004)                                                             
extremely high level:                                                                   
> 90% (Weber et al., 2004)    
Debt guarantees 
complex security system using different 
instruments such as pledges, Step-in-
Rights, reserve accounts 
less complex security system, no 
reserve accounts 
Due diligence  extensive due diligence by banks 
low degree of due diligence by 
banks 
Transaction costs and 
time 
high due to extensive screening of 
project by banks 
low due to low degree of due 
diligence by banks 
Equity investors  
low number of sponsors according to 
Esty (2004) limited to one to three, 
financial investors  
low number of sponsors, no 
financial investors 
Financing costs 
high including: interest, cost of hedging, 
commitment and arrangement fee, 
documentation and processing fee  
low including: interest, cost of 
hedging and a structuring fee  
Interest rate spread9 
spread varies between 90 bps and 130 
bps for the construction phase and 
between 80 bps and 140 bps for 
operation phase in Germany (Weber et 
al., 2004)  
spread varies between 20 bps and 
50 bps for construction and 
operation phase in Germany 
(Weber et al., 2004) 
Financing conditions 
inferior financing conditions (floating 
interest rate, no match of debt maturity 
and project duration) 
good financing conditions (rather 
fixed interest rate, match of debt 
maturity and project duration) 
Payments by the public 
partner in case of bad 
or non-performance 
can be cut according to bonus/malus 
agreements in the contract  
cannot be cut for construction 
services but for other receivables 
which are not sold to the bank 
Impact of the financial 
crisis 
big impact on financing conditions, 
projects often not feasible 
lower impact on financing 
conditions, projects still feasible 
Source: own exhibit 
                                                             
9 increased for both models with financial crisis cf. Table A2 in Appendix  
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5.9 ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF BOTH MODELS 
From the current analysis in chapters 5.1 to 5.8 advantages and disadvantages can be derived. 
They are presented from the viewpoint of the public partner, as it is their responsibility to 
make the decision about entering a PPP and ultimately deciding about financing. 
 
One of the main advantages and main characteristic of PF is the transfer of risks to the party 
which is best able to manage it which in consequence leads to an improved risk allocation. 
Hence, most of the risks are transferred to lenders and the private party, since debt has to be 
repaid with the generated cash flows of the project company. Further advantages are 
prevailing incentive mechanisms such as the private contractor’s obligation to provide equity 
and bonus/malus agreements increasing the effort of the private partner to maximize the 
project’s performance. As banks bear risks under PF, they conduct an extensive due diligence 
and project controlling examining and guaranteeing the feasibility of the project. Lastly, a 
more comprehensive security system such as the provision of reserve accounts demanded by 
the bank further improves the sustainability of the project.    
 
However, a main disadvantage of PF over forfaiting is worse financing conditions including 
higher financing costs. Moreover, extensive due diligence involves high transaction cost and 
time. Even though a more comprehensive security system assures the sustainability of the 
project, it also increases the complexity of it. Lastly, a main disadvantage is PF’s variability 
during times of crisis. The analysis showed that worsened credit conditions during the 
financial crisis clearly degraded the PPP alternative under PF compared to public 
procurement. 
 
In contrast, low financing costs can be derived to be forfaiting’s main advantage. Low 
borrowing as well as transaction costs can be obtained, as banks base credit conditions on the 
solvency of the public authority and only conduct limited due diligence. Moreover, better 
financing conditions are provided by lenders due to the fact that these are based on the 
solvency of the public partner. Hence, it is more lik ly that interest rates are fixed allowing 
for more adequate planning and calculus. On top, a match of project duration and credit term 
lead to reduced unitary payments, as they are stretched out over the remaining life-cycle of 
the projects (Weber et al., 2004). Another advantage is the inherent low transaction time 
leading to a shorter procurement process. In conjunctio  with a lower security system 
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forfaiting is clearly less complex and more flexible. A further main advantage is the method’s 
sustainability during crisis.   
 
Nevertheless, the low financing cost under forfaiting comes at the expense of a low risk 
transfer. Only little of the risk is transferred tohe private contractor leaving the public 
authority with a big part of risk. Unitary payments for construction have to be made 
independent of the private partner’s performance. Moreover, no extensive due diligence and 
project controlling is conducted by the banks leaving the public partner with the responsibility 
of committing own resources in order to prove and guarantee the feasibility of the project 
resulting in additional costs for the public procurer (Weber et al., 2004). Forfaiting misses 
central incentive mechanisms to increase the private contractor’s performance due to the 
waiver of claims (Braune, 2006). Lastly, forfaiting is not an appropriate model for financial 
investors due to the extremely low stake of equity (Weber et al., 2004). Table A3 (in 
Appendix) provides an overview of the described advantages and disadvantages.  
 
CHAPTER  6: STATISTICAL  ANALYSIS  OF 
FINANCING  MODELS  IN  GERMANY 
6.1 MAIN RESULTS 
So far, the study has looked at the two different fi ancing models in more detail. The 
following chapter aims to find out, if the financial crisis is a driver for a potential increase in 
financing PPPs under forfaiting in Germany. It is further intended to identify the magnitude of 
a potential shift from forfaiting to PF. Therefore, with the help of data provided by the 
Federation of the German Construction Industry quantitative analysis was conducted to 
observe characteristics and the development of PPP financing in building construction in 
Germany.  
 
The sample period comprises 164 PPPs awarded between January 2002 and June 2013. Table 
A4 (in Appendix) provides an overview of the distribution of forfaiting and PF in terms of 
number of projects and investment volume. Out of the 164 projects, 133 were financed by 
forfaiting whereas only 31 were financed by PF. Theinvestment volume, totaling 4,709.7 € M 
overall, adds up to 2,656.3 € M under forfaiting and to 2,053.4 € M under PF. There has been 
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an obvious decrease in the number of PPP projects since 2008. Doubtlessly, more projects 
have been financed by forfaiting than by PF, especially since 2007. 
 
Table A5 (in Appendix) presents the descriptive statistics of the sample. The average 
investment volume amounts to 28.72 € M for the whole sample and to 66.24 € M respectively 
to 19.97 € M for PF and forfaiting. The smallest investment volume adds up to 1 € M, 
whereas the maximum amounts to 258 € M. 81% of the projects have been financed by 
forfaiting. The standard deviation for the investment volume amounts to 40.51 € M. 
 











Graph 2: Yearly share of Forfaiting based on the total number of projects and 
investment volume 
 
      Source: own exhibit 
 
Graph 1 clearly shows that most of the PPPs in building construction are financed by 
forfaiting. 2007 is the year with the highest number of projects financed by PF (9 projects). 
This is in line with the observations from Daube et al. (2008) who observed an increase in PF 
in the beginning of 2007. However, from 2008 on, the percentage of forfaiting of total 
projects increased remarkably, up to 91.67% in 2009 (Graph 2). Even though the share of 
forfaiting of total number of projects is high, there is a noticeable difference in distribution 
between the number of projects and investment volume. For the whole sample, 81.1% of the 
projects have been financed using forfaiting, whereas only 56.4% of the total investment 
volume is derived by forfaiting.  
 
Connected to these findings, looking at different investment volume ranges in Table A6 (in 
Appendix) it can further be proved that forfaiting is mainly used for very small projects and 
primarily for projects below 100 € M. Projects below 15 € M have been financed by forfaiting 
in 92.41% of the cases. This share is continuously decreasing with a rising investment volume 
of the projects. Projects higher than 100 € M have only been financed by forfaiting in 20% of 




Looking at Table 2 it is further striking that all projects realized by the German State have 
been financed by PF, whereas 54% of regional and 89% of municipal projects have been 
financed by forfaiting. Again, the share of forfaiting of the total number of projects is 
noticeably higher than the share of forfaiting of ttal investment volume (23% respectively 
79% for regional and municipal projects). However, only 4 projects have been implemented 
on the State level compared to 28 and 132 PPPs on the regional respectively municipal level. 
 
Table 2: Distribution of Forfaiting and Project Finance for the three governing levels in 
Germany   
  State  Regional  Municipal  Total  
Total Number of projects 4 28 132 164 
Forfaiting 0 15 118 133 
Project Finance 4 13 14 31 
% of Forfaiting of total 
number of projects 0.00% 53.57% 89.39% 81.10% 
          
Total Investment volume 427 1,325.52 2,957.19 4,709.70 
Forfaiting 0 309.62 2,346.69 2,656.30 
Project Finance 427 1,015.90 610.50 2,053.40 
% of Forfaiting of total 
investment volume 0.00% 23.36% 79.36% 56.40% 
                          Source: own exhibit 
 
6.2 SAMPLE SPLIT ANALYSIS 
In order to observe a potential shift to forfaiting since the beginning of the financial crisis the 
sample was split in two periods taking the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers in 2008 as a 
reference point. The first period comprises projects awarded between 2002 and August 2008 
(before the financial crisis), whereas the second period comprises projects awarded between 
September 2008 and June 2013 (after the financial crisis). 
 
Table A7 (in Appendix) shows the distribution of forfaiting and PF for the two sample 
periods. During the period before the financial crisis a total of 96 projects were set up out of 
which 74 were financed by forfaiting and 22 by PF. On the contrary, the sample period after 
the financial crisis comprises 68 projects, 59 financed by forfaiting and 9 by PF. The total 
investment volume for the first period adds up to 2,900.75 € M. Out of the total 1,339.15 € M 
was raised under forfaiting and 1,561.60 € M under PF. The total investment volume for the 
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second period declined to 1,808.95 € M. Capital raised under forfaiting adds up to 1,317.15 € 
M but only to 491.80 € M for PF. 
 
Table A8 (in Appendix) shows the descriptive statistics for the two periods. The average 
investment volume amounts to 30.22 € M for the first period as well as to 70.98 € M and 
18.10 € M for PF respectively forfaiting. Compared to the second sample period the average 
investment volume decreased to 26.60 € M and to 54.64 € M for PF projects. On the contrary, 
the average investment volume increased to 22.32 € M for forfaiting. Moreover, the 
maximum investment volume before the financial crisis amounts to 258 € M respectively to 
196.1 € M after it. The standard deviation of investment volume decreased from 45.10 € M to 
33.12 € M.  
 
Looking at the share of forfaiting for the number of projects and investment volume in Graph 
3 one can notice that 86.76% of the projects were financed by forfaiting after the outburst of 
financial crisis. This is an increase of 12.56% (Table A7 in Appendix). On top, the percentage 
of forfaiting regarding investment volume increased r markable 57.72% to 72.81% for the 
second period. At the same time the percentage of financing by PF decreased by 42.25% from 
22.92% to 13.24% % (Table A7 in Appendix). Looking at the share of PF financing  terms 
of investment volume it decreased by 49.50% from 53.83% to 27.19%. 
 
Graph 3: Share of Forfaiting based on total number of projects and investment volume 
 
Source: own exhibit 
 
Moreover, Table 3 outlines the different investment volume ranges for the two periods under 
observation further highlighting that after the outburst of the financial crisis forfaiting was 
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increasingly used as a financing method for projects of bigger investment volumes. During 
the latter period, the share of forfaiting increased especially for projects bigger than 25 € M. 
 
Table 3: Distribution of PPP financing for different investment volume ranges for the 
first sample split 
  <15€ M 15-25€ M 25-50€ M 50-100€ M >100€ M Total  
  2002 to 08/2008       
Number of projects 45 23 16 5 7 96 
Forfaiting 41 19 11 2 1 74 
Project Finance 4 4 5 3 6 22 
% of Forfaiting 91.11% 82.61% 68.75% 40.00% 14.29% 77.08% 
              
  09/2008 to 06/2013       
Number of projects 34 16 5 10 3 68 
Forfaiting 32 14 5 7 1 59 
Project Finance 2 2 0 3 2 9 
% of Forfaiting 94.12% 87.50% 100.00% 70.00% 33.33% 86.76% 
Source: own exhibit 
 
The beginning of the financial crisis is considered by many as of August 2007 when bank 
refinancing started to get more expensive. Therefore, a further sample split was conducted 
considering the periods from 2002 - 08/2007 and 09/2 08 - 06/2013. Comparing the two 
sample splits similar observations can be made notici g among others that the share of 
forfaiting was increasing and that the overall averg  investment volume was decreasing and 
yet increasing for forfaiting (cf. Tables A7 and A8 in Appendix). However, in general 
changes are more significant for the first sample split taking the bankruptcy of Lehman 
Brother’s as a reference point.  
CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSION AND FURTHER RESEARCH 
7.1 MAIN FINDINGS  
Project finance being the dominant financing model for PPPs world-wide has encountered 
many obstacles during crises, especially during the last financial crisis. However, a financing 
model called forfaiting has been implemented since the introduction of PPPs in Germany. The 
study aimed to find out in how far and under which conditions forfaiting can be an alternative 
financing model for PPPs. Therefore, center of analysis was a conceptual discussion and 
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comparison of PF and forfaiting deriving each model’s advantages and disadvantages. 
Analyzing the financing patterns of PPPs in building construction allowed further conclusions 
about the characteristics of PPP financing in Germany and especially of forfaiting. 
 
As Germany has a well-functioning traditional public procurement sector with an unbeatable 
funding situation, forfaiting offers a viable third way between PPPs financed by PF and direct 
procurement (Blott, 2012). The comparative analysis found out that under forfaiting less risk 
is allocated to the private procurer respectively lnders, making it a rather cheap financing 
alternative compared to PF, as the waiver of claims issued by the public procurer guarantees 
payments for construction independent of performance. In contrast, PF is characterized by an 
improved risk allocation at the expense of higher costs including financing and transaction 
cost arising from an intensive due diligence done by banks.  
 
The study showed that forfaiting is the dominant fiancing model used for PPPs in building 
construction in Germany. Since the major part of PPPs in Germany belongs to this sector, it 
can doubtlessly be said that most of the PPPs in Germany are financed by forfaiting. The 
German PPP market is clearly characterized by smaller projects on the municipal and regional 
level. Projects financed by PF are usually bigger in terms of investment volume than those 
under forfaiting.  
 
The following developed argumentation is one feasible explanation why most of the projects 
in Germany are financed by forfaiting. The analysis found out that high fixed costs 
(transactions costs) occur under PF. Accordingly, one can infer that PF is not an appropriate 
financing model for smaller scale projects. Especially for investment volumes below 25 € M it 
is necessary to prove that the project can absorb the transaction costs and that a sustainable 
cost advantage and value for money is provided withthe PPP project (Weber et al., 2004). A 
study conducted in the UK found out that projects with a project volume of less than 30 GBP 
M (36.84 € M10) do not meet the expected return of sponsors due to high transaction cost 
(Braune, 2006). However, examining the risk/ reward relation, PF provides more value for 
money for big projects than forfaiting (Hopfe et al., 2009). As discussed above the German 
market is characterized by small projects on the municipal level with 72% of the projects 
comprising an investment volume of less than 25 € M. Accordingly, it can be concluded that, 
in general, PF is not an appropriate financing model for most of the German PPPs.  
                                                             
10 As of 17th of May 
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Furthermore, the analysis showed that there was an evident shift towards forfaiting with the 
start of the financial crisis. Even though the overall average investment volume decreased and 
the German PPP market was hit hard by the financial crisis, the share of forfaiting regarding 
total projects and investment volume increased. At the same time the share of PF regarding 
investment volume decreased significantly. The analysis found out that the decline in PF is 
traced back to the facts that the syndication market collapsed, banks got more risk averse 
during the financial crisis trying to avoid complex projects with market risk, and to the fact 
that the credit supply by banks was decreased significa tly. Moreover, the deteriorating 
financing conditions offered by banks after the outburst of the financial crisis clearly 
decreased the feasibility of PPPs planned to be financed with PF (Partnerships Germany, 
2010). Projects financed by forfaiting, however, remained to be feasible. Hence, it can be 
assumed that the shift towards forfaiting results from the fact that projects planned to be 
financed by PF have alternatively been financed by forfaiting and/or dropped.  
 
As expected the second sample split delivered similar results. However, the impact of the 
financial crisis connected with an increasing shift towards forfaiting in Germany is more 
significant for the first sample split taking the bankruptcy of Lehman Brother’s as a reference 
point proving that it took more than a year for thefinancial crisis to unfold entirely.  
 
Usually every project is special in nature and therefore needs thoroughness when choosing the 
appropriate financing model. The authors do not recommend on when to use which financing 
model due to the individuality of each PPP. The sample analysis has shown that very small 
projects have been financed by PF, while larger projects (bigger than 100 € M) have also been 
financed by forfaiting. However, derived from the analysis one can generalize that smaller 
projects are more likely to be financed by forfaiting, whereas bigger projects are more likely 
to be financed by PF in Germany. This however changes during periods when financing cost 
increase and PF becomes rather expensive.  
 
When choosing PF as the appropriate financing method, it has to be guaranteed that enough of 
the risks are transferred to compensate for the higher cost arising under PF (Leidinger and 
Prien, 2010). On the other side, the analysis showed that forfaiting does not only provide 
favorable financing conditions. Most notably, the public procurer faces increased risk, and 
costs which arise from own due diligence efforts. This has to be considered as well when 
choosing the appropriate financing model. 
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To sum it up, forfaiting is an alternative financing model for PPPs not only in times of crisis. 
Especially for projects of smaller scale, forfaiting is an attractive financing approach to 
consider. As Poland’s legal system is similar to that of Germany, the government introduced 
forfaiting as a form of financing PPPs (Haak and Schnell, 2009; Szewczyk, 2013).  However, 
further countries should consider forfaiting as an alternative financing model to PF. 
7.2 LIMITATION OF THE STUDY AND FURTHER RESEARCH  
First of all, the authors want to stress the fact tha he data and numbers used for the analysis 
are, if not labeled otherwise, based on the German PPP and financing market, and should 
therefore be treated carefully when generalizing, especially since financing conditions and 
PPP markets vary from country to country. 
 
Moreover, the quantitative analysis of the study is only focused on projects in building 
construction. However, this is just one main sector of PPP activity in German. Especially 
bigger projects such as in transportation have been mai ly financed with PF. However, the 
number of projects is rather limited compared to the number of projects in building 
construction. Only 1311 projects have been set up in transportation so far. Mo eover, as of 
2011 the data provided is partly incomplete regarding the financing model chosen. 
Accordingly, 30 projects out of 204 have been taken out based on this lack of data. Though, 
the characteristics of these projects indicate thatey have been financed by forfaiting 
enforcing the findings of the analysis. 
 
The PPP and financing market is obviously different from country to country. In order to find 
out, if forfaiting can be implemented as an alternative financing model in different countries, 
one has not only to analyze the country’s PPP and financing market but also to find out, if 
comparable models to forfaiting have already been implemented. Moreover, it is of utmost 
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APPENDIX   
Table A1: PPP models in Germany building construction 
Model Model description Payments  
Owner model 
The private contractor is in charge of planning, construction, 
financing and operation of a facility/asset;  public partner 





Compared to the owner model the private operator maintains 
ownership of facility/asset until the expiration ofthe contract 
with ownership transfer thereafter 
Periodical fee 
Leasing model 
The public procurer leases the facility from the private contractor 
(lessor) who maintains ownership; compared to acquisition 
model there is the option but not obligation to buy 




The private contractor owns the facility/asset which is used by 
the public procurer by means of a rent contract; similar to leasing 
model but without a predetermined terminal value for buy 




Contract instructing the private contractor to operat  a 




Public partner functions as a shareholder of the project company; 
combined with the above described models 
Depends on combined 
model 
License model 
Contrary to the other models the public procurer is not the direct 
user of the facility/asset. The private partner provides a service 
for a third party who usually pays the private contrac or for usage 
of the service 
User fee; subsidies 
from public procurer 
possible 
  Source: adapted from Hoppenberg et al. (2009) 
 
Graph A1: Sector distribution for PPPs in building construction in number of projects 
 
 Source: own exhibit; data provided by the FGCI  - comprises all PPP projects from 2002 – March 2014 in building construction; total 








Source: own exhibit; data provided by the FGCI  - comprises all PPP projects from 2002 – March 2014 in building construction; total 
projects: 204, total investment volume: 5,895.41 € M  
 
 
Graph A3: Regional distribution of PPPs in building construction  
 
 
Source: own exhibit; data provided by the FGCI  - comprises all PPP projects from 2002 – March 2014 in building construction; total 









Table A2: Overview of financing cost before and after the burst of the 2008’s financial 
crisis for PF and Forfaiting in Germany 
Conditions before the financial crisis (2005-2008) Conditions since the financial crisis 
Interim financing construction phase 
Arrangement Fee: none Arrangement Fee: 100 - 150  bps 
Margin (incl. Liquidity margin): 55 - 60 bps Margin (incl. Liquidity margin): 150 - 400 bps 
Commitment fee: 15 bps Commitment fee: approximately 50% of margin 
Post-delivery financing 
Project Finance: margin approx. 70 - 90 bps Project Finance: margin approx. 150 - 350 bps 
Forfaiting: margin approx. 7 - 12 bps Forfaiting: margin approx. 40 - 100 bps 
Source: Partnerships Germany (2010) 
 
Table A3: Advantages and Disadvantages of PF and Forfaiting from public procurer’s 
point of view 
Project Finance Forfaiting 
Advantages 
● high level of risk allocation among parties involved 
in the project 
●low financing cost (transaction cost and 
borrowing costs) 
●Incentive mechanisms (equity and bonus/ malus 
specifications) increase the effort of the private 
partner and therefore project performance 
●good financing conditions:                                                                                             
- fixed interest rate minimizes interest rate risk                                                                     
- congruent project duration and credit term 
reduce monthly payments 
●extensive due diligence and project controlling done 
by banks  
●low transaction time 
●comprehensive securities  ●less complex and more flexible 
●sustain feasibility during crisis time 
Disadvantages 
●high financing cost (transaction cost and borrowing 
costs) 
● low level of risk allocation among parties 
involved in the project 
●inferior financing conditions:                                                                                         
- floating interest rate create interest rate risk                                     
- no match of project  duration and credit term  
●public partner takes back risk initially 
transferred to the private sector under PPP 
concept 
●long transaction time ●no extensive due diligence and project 
controlling done by banks  
●high complexity  ●low incentive mechanisms (low equity stake, 
waiver of claims)  
●low feasibility during crisis time ●not appropriate model for financial investors 
 






Table A4: Yearly distribution of Forfaiting and Pro ject Finance in terms of number of 


















Table A5: Descriptive statistics for the whole PPP sample 
















            
Mean 28.72 0.81 66.24 19.97 24.22 
Median 15 1 40 13.10 25 
Standard Deviation 40.51 0.39 67.20 24.34 4.68 
Minimum 1 0 6 1 10 
Maximum 258 1 258 196.1 50 
Source: own exhibit; column financing model: 0= Project Finance  and 1= Forfaiting 
 
 
Table A6: Distribution of PPP financing for different investment volume ranges for the 
whole sample 
            
  <15€ M 15-25€ M 25-50€ M 50-100€ M >100€ M Total 
Number of projects 79 39 21 15 10 164 
Forfaiting 73 33 16 9 2 133 
Project Finance 6 6 5 6 8 31 
% of Forfaiting 92.41% 84.62% 76.19% 60.00% 20.00% 81.10% 



































Table A8: Descriptive statistics for the two sample splits 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
